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I. Introduction 
 
We provide an historical perspective on the impact of a global pandemic on stock prices. 
The Spanish flu was the deadliest pandemic of the twentieth century. It killed approximately 2 
percent of the global population and 675,000 Americans over a two-year period that covered four 
waves of the virus. We examine the effect of the 1918 Spanish Flu on the aggregate U.S. stock 
market given that the influenza was the last global pandemic that is similar in magnitude to the 
current coronavirus outbreak. Our study uses a new weekly, equally-weighted stock index of 149 
firms constructed from stock prices taken from the New York Times. Simple descriptive statistics 
suggest that the pandemic may have mattered big time for stock prices given that the simple 
correlation coefficient between the log death rate and the log of the aggregate stock index is -.73 
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from September 1918 to March 1920. The nine NYSE sectors in our sample also have 
correlation coefficients with the flu variable ranging from -.40 to -.76.1 
We focus on the impact of the virus on the aggregate stock market as opposed to GDP 
because macroeconomic data are often only available at the annual frequency for this time period 
and of questionable quality given that national income accounting was developed in the post-
World War II period. Furthermore, the aggregate stock market has been shown to forecast future 
economic activity (Fama 1990; Schwert, 1990). Our new weekly U.S. stock index provides high 
frequency identification and a window into the effects of the influenza on the aggregate stock 
market as well as different stock market sectors.2  
An empirical analysis of the Spanish flu is potentially complicated by the fact that the 
grip was concurrent with the end of World War I. It is likely that the influenza had a negative 
impact on stock prices while asset prices increased in value with good war news and an end to 
the World War. To separately identify the two factors, we estimate vector autoregressions to 
measure the dynamic impact of the Spanish flu and World War I on U.S. stock prices.  We use 
the death rate to control for the impact of the grip on stock prices and war news reported in the 
New York Times to capture the effect of World War I on asset prices. We employ vector 
autoregressions for the empirical analysis since we have a small number of stock sectors (9), and 
a much larger number of weeks (81 weeks) in the data sample. 
 The empirical analysis demonstrates that the Spanish flu had a large impact on the stock 
market. Specifically, we find that the Spanish flu can explain 24 percent of the forecast error 
 
1 In the Appendix we plot the association between sectoral stock market indices  and death rate. 
2 Barro et al. (2020) examine the impact of the Spanish flu on economic activity in a cross-section of countries over 
time. They find that influenza reduced real stock prices in their panel analysis. Bodenhorn and Velde (2020) 
examine the impact of the Spanish flu on U.S. economic activity. Cortes and Verdickt (2020) examine the impact of 
the Spanish flu on the U.S. insurance industry. 
 
 
 4 
variance in the aggregate U.S. market from September 1918 until March 1920. Furthermore, we 
find that the pandemic had a significant, but varying impact across nine NYSE sectors. We also 
find that war news increased stock prices as the Allies marched to victory in the fall of 1918. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the 1918 Spanish flu had a large negative impact on U.S. stock 
prices and probably depressed the market for more than a year. 
 We begin the empirical analysis with a brief history of the pandemic in the United States. 
Then we provide a description of the data used in the study. This is followed by an empirical 
analysis of the 1918 Spanish flu using vector autoregressions. We then conclude the study with a 
discussion of the implication of the results for asset returns and pandemics.   
   
II. A Brief History of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic 
 
As the U.S. scaled up training and troop deployments in the last year of World War I, a 
novel influenza virus began spreading.   Detected in Kansas in March of 1918, the new influenza 
spread through the Army training camp in Fort Riley, Kansas:  Over 100 soldiers became ill in 
March and the number of flu cases increased five-fold within a week (CDC, 2018).  The first 
public mention of the pandemic came in April 1918 with 18 cases and 3 deaths in Haskell, 
Kansas.   The U.S. military grew to 4.7 million soldiers by April 1918, and dozens of camps 
across the U.S. trained tens of thousands of troops at a time creating ideal conditions for 
spreading the virus through the military.  As the war continued, hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers traveled to Europe each month.   The first wave of the influenza made little news in the 
U.S., and U.S. cases waned over the summer.   Through the spring and summer of 1918 
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newspapers published articles about the “grip” and “German sickness” – all focused on the 
spread of flu in Europe and often emphasized its negative impact on the enemy.    
By September, the second wave arrived back in the US, appearing first in military bases 
in the Boston area. “By the end of September, more than 14,000 flu cases are reported at Camp 
Devens—equaling about one-quarter of the total camp, resulting in 757 deaths”  (CDC, 2018). 
Again, the close quarters facilitated the spread of the virus among the troops, and the movements 
of troops continued to transport the virus back across the Atlantic to the U.S.   The autumn 1918 
wave brought far more infections, community spread, and high death rates. According to a “war 
department” analysis at the time, the pervasive outbreaks of flu among enlisted men cost the 
Army 8,743,102 work-days in 1918 alone (Byerly, 2010). 
The flu struck and spread to different regions across the country, depending both on 
transportation patterns and on the mitigation measures different cities took.   Some locales closed 
gathering places (movies, theaters, pubs, and some types of schools), required masks in public, 
and forced sickened individuals and whole families into quarantine.   Some cities hosted mass 
war victory celebrations, which caused huge spikes in infections and deaths. 
The third wave developed over the winter and spring of 1919.  San Francisco recorded 
1,800 new cases and 101 deaths in the first five days of January (CDC, 2018).   Even President 
Wilson was stricken, collapsing at the Versailles conference in April 1919.   Flu subsided over the 
summer of 1919 but more cases emerged over the subsequent winter, creating a fourth wave that 
continued into the early months of 1920—clearly evident in the “death rate” shown in Figure 1. 
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III. Data  
 
The data come from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) database detailed in Fohlin 
(2019).  The data used in this paper include transaction prices for all common stocks that traded 
on the NYSE every Friday from 1918 through 1920.  The full dataset covers 1911-1925 and 
incorporates all data reported in the New York Times stock tables:  The data include the full 
company names with details on type of security (preferred, rights, trust certificates), ex-dividend 
days, ex-rights days, and any other details; number of shares traded (“sales”); first and last 
transaction prices, as well as high and low transaction prices; and the quoted bid and ask prices 
prevailing at the close of the market.  Our total market index is an equally-weighted average of 
149 stocks that had no more than two weeks in which they did not trade. The sample covers the 
period September 1918 through March 1920 for a total of 81 weekly observations.    
We employ weekly death rates from influenza and pneumonia for 35 cities in the United 
States. The data are taken from Collins et al. (1930). Our sample begins in September 1918, the 
first month for which there is weekly mortality data from the flu, and ends in March 1920 after 
the end of the fourth wave of the pandemic. War news is defined as the weekly number of 
newspaper stories (article, display ad, editorial article, front page and letter to editor) that 
mention terms related to World War I in the New York Times from  September 1918 to March 
1920. To construct this variable we searched the ProQuest Newspaper Archive for stories that 
contained the following keywords:  i) "world war" or "Great War" or "European War", and  ii) 
one of the following terms : “deaths" or "casualties" or "military conflict" or "invasion" or 
"blockade" or "killed in action" or "fatalities" or "killed in battle". 
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IV. Empirical Analysis  
 
 We begin the empirical analysis by looking at simple descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for the aggregate 
stock market and control variables. The equally-weighted stock index has a mean value of 65.11 
and a standard deviation of 7.26. The death rate variable has a mean of 581.37 and a standard 
deviation of 907.38. The flu variable has a large standard deviation which reflects the dramatic 
rise in deaths with the outbreak of the grip in August and September 1918. The log of the pandemic 
covariate has a -.73 percent correlation with the log of the aggregate stock index. The war news 
variable has a mean of 2.21 and a standard deviation of 1.53. 
Next, we estimate vector autoregressions (VARs) to analyze the dynamic effects of the 
Spanish flu on U.S. stock prices. We use VARs because our data sample has a small number of 
stock sectors (9) and a much longer time series of asset prices (81 weeks). The makeup of the data 
series strongly suggests time series methods as opposed to a panel analysis that relies primarily on 
the cross-section for identification. Formally, we estimate the following specification: 
Yt = A0 + A1Yt – 1 + (…) + APYt – P + εt,    εt ~ N(0, Σ) (1) 
where Yt is a vector of macroeconomic variables described below, A0 is a matrix of intercept 
coefficients, and A1 through AP are matrices of coefficients relative to each lag of Y, ranging 
from 1 to P. To obtain causal relationships between the variables of the VAR, we estimate 
equation (1) and map the reduced-form shocks εt into structural shocks applying a Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix Σ. This procedure—known as recursive 
identification implies that the ordering of the variables matters for determining the dynamic 
relationships between the VAR variables. 
 
 
 8 
We specify a three-variable vector autoregression (VAR) that includes the log of the 
equally-weighted stock price index of NYSE firms (NYSE), a World War I news variable 
(NEWS), and the log of the death rate (DEATH). The sample covers the period from September 
1918 until the end of March 1920. We select a lag length of 2 weeks based on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). The impulse responses show the impact of a one-standard deviation 
shock to the death rate and war news on stock prices along with 68 percent confidence intervals. 
We give the log of the equally-weighted index the first ordering since asset prices quickly 
respond to new information. War news is given the second ordering since World War I predates 
the outbreak of the Spanish flu. This means that the log of the death rate is given the third 
ordering.3 The impulse responses for the aggregate stock market are reported in Figure 2. A one-
standard deviation shock to the death rate reduces the equally-weighted stock index. A shock to 
the war news variable also has a statistically significant effect on stock prices. As for the forecast 
error variance, we find that the death rate can explain 24 percent of the movements in stock 
prices after 16 weeks. On the other hand, the war news variable can only account for about 3.7 
percent of the fluctuations in stock prices4. The significant, but small impact of the war news 
variable may be explained by the fact that World War I ended three months into our sample 
period. If flu data were available starting in 1918, it is likely that war news would have a much 
larger impact on stock prices. Another possibility is that lags of the aggregate stock market index 
might also capture the positive effect of war news on asset prices. 
 
3 The empirical results are robust to giving death rate the second ordering in the Cholesky decomposition. Details 
are available from the authors by request. 
4 The results are robust if we restrict the sample to years 1918 and 1919. Death rate can explain 42 percent of the 
movements in stock prices after 16 weeks, while war news can explain 4 percent of the fluctuations in stock prices.  
Also, at 90% confidence level, death rate continues to have a robust and significant effect on stock prices, while war 
news has no effect.   
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Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the Spanish flu had a large and negative impact 
on the aggregate stock index. 5 
 We follow-up the baseline analysis by examining the impact of the Spanish flu on nine 
sectors of the New York Stock Exchange. The nine sectors are automobile, consumer products, 
light manufacturing, mining and oil, other manufacturing, railroads, steel, trade and services, and 
utilities. We use the equally-weighted index to control for overall market conditions. Table 2 
reports summary statistics for the nine NYSE sectors. The mean index value ranges from 33.84 
for mining and oil sector to 111.19 for trade and services. The standard deviation ranges from 
2.56 for mining and oil to 20.40 for automobiles. The log of the nine sector indices has a 
correlation coefficient ranging from -.40 to -.76 which indicates a strong statistical relationship 
between the pandemic and the aggregate stock index. 
Figure 3a shows the impulse responses of a given sector to a one-standard deviation 
shock to the log of death rate. We give the log of the sector index the first ordering, followed by 
the log of the market index, war news, and the log of the death rate.6 Table 3 shows the forecast 
error variance for each of the nine sectors. Figure 3a shows that the death rate significantly 
lowers the automobile index. The Spanish flu can explain 17.7 percent of the movements in the 
automobile index after 16 weeks. Second, the consumer products index presented in Figure 3a 
significantly falls in response to a one-standard deviation shock to the flu variable. The death rate 
can account for 23.3 percent of the movements in the consumer products index after 16 weeks. 
With respect to light manufacturing, Figure 3a shows that the death rate significantly reduces the 
light manufacturing sector. The death rate can account for 13.9 percent of the movements in the 
 
5 We also looked at the impact of mitigation measures on stock prices. Mitigation measures included public 
gatherings bans and school closures across 39 cities. Although the mitigation measures were statistically significant, 
they explain less than one percent of the forecast error variance in stock prices 
6 Lag lengths for the sector VARs were selected on the basis of the AIC criteria. 
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light manufacturing sector index after 16 weeks. A shock to the death rate presented in Figure 3a 
significantly decreases mining and oil. The grip can explain 23 percent of the movements in the 
industrial index after 16 weeks. An increase in the death rate significantly reduces the other 
manufacturing sector in Figure 3b, explaining 19.1 percent of the movements in the sector after 
16 weeks.  
The railroad index also shown in Figure 3b significantly falls in response to a one-
standard deviation shock to the influenza variable. The flu can explain 5.7 percent of the 
fluctuations in the railroad sector. In addition, the steel sector presented in Figure 3b declines 
following a shock to the death rate. The influenza variable can explain 13.4 percent of the 
movements in steel. A shock to the death rate significantly reduces the trade and service index. 
The death rate can account for 21.4 percent of the movements in the trade and service index after 
16 weeks. Finally, the utility sector falls in response to a shock to the death rate. The flu 
variables explain 24.1 percent of the fluctuations in the utility sector.  
With respect to the impact of war news on stock prices, Figures 4a and 4b show that a 
one-standard deviation shock to war news has a statistically significant effect on four of the nine 
sector indices. A one-standard deviation shock to war news significantly increased consumer 
products, light manufacturing, steel, and trade and services. War news can explain 5.5, 3.7, 2.0, 
and 6.3 percent of the forecast error variance (FEVD) for the four sectors at a sixteen-week 
forecast horizon, respectively.  
The rise in the U.S. stock market in 1918-1920 also reflects the return to a peacetime 
economy that was shifting from producing guns to butter. Trading activity on the NYSE, for 
example, grew rapidly at the end of World War I and the early 1920s. The number of actively 
traded common stocks increased from roughly 150 to 250 between 1918 and 1920.   Meanwhile, 
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volume (number of shares traded) rose from an average of 380 thousand shares in the 1911-14 
period to nearly 870 thousand shares on average in the 1919-22 period. Dollar volume, in 
nominal terms, rose less dramatically, from an average of $37 million per day in the early period 
to about $55.5 million per day in the post-war period.  
 
V. Conclusion 
  
We examine the effect of the 1918 Spanish flu, a global pandemic, on U.S. stock prices. 
We estimate simple vector autoregressions to assess the impact of the influenza on firms that 
traded on NYSE using a new weekly stock price index collected from the New York Times as 
well as news articles to control for the impact of the end of World War I. Simple summary 
statistics show that there a -.73 correlation between the log of the death rate and the log of the 
aggregate stock index. Then we estimate vector autoregressions that demonstrate that the grip 
can explain up to 24 percent of the forecast error variance of the aggregate U.S. stock market 
after 16 weeks. We follow-up the aggregate analysis by examining the effect of the influenza on 
nine NYSE sectors. The analysis shows that the pandemic had a significant and negative impact 
on all nine sectoral indices. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the Spanish flu mattered 
big time for U.S stock prices from 1918-1920.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics           
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Equally Weighted Stock Market 
Index 81 65.11 7.26 54 77.82 
Death Rate 81 581.37 907.38 46 4915 
War News 81 2.21 1.53 0 7 
Source: Author's calculations      
      
Table 2.  Summary Statistics, NYSE Sectors         
Sector Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Automobile 81 90.42 20.40 63.73 129.01 
Consumer Products 81 102.18 14.11 82.09 128.11 
Light Manufacturing 81 70.42 11.14 49.39 86.78 
Mining & Oil 81 33.84 2.56 28.30 39.11 
Other Manufacturing 81 75.90 10.28 56.73 92.61 
Railroads 81 55.50 3.24 47.66 62.80 
Steel 81 54.70 6.53 42.88 66.32 
Trade & Service 81 111.19 10.69 91.70 129.03 
Utilities 81 39.60 4.13 33.59 49.93 
Source: Author's calculations      
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Table 3.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions for Nine NYSE Sectors     
A.  Death Rate 
Weeks Automobile Consumer Products 
Light 
Manufacturing 
Mining & 
Oil 
Other 
Manufacturing Railroads Steel 
Trade & 
Service Utility 
4 4.1% 4.3% 2.5% 3.2% 4.2% 2.7% 1.2% 4.7% 6.9% 
8 15.3% 21.2% 11.5% 17.7% 17.2% 5.7% 7.6% 18.9% 22.3% 
12 18.0% 25.0% 14.6% 23.0% 20.6% 5.5% 11.9% 22.1% 24.8% 
16 17.7% 23.3% 13.9% 23.0% 19.1% 5.7% 13.4% 21.4% 24.1% 
          
B.    War News 
Weeks Automobile Consumer Products 
Light 
Manufacturing 
Mining & 
Oil 
Other 
Manufacturing Railroads Steel 
Trade & 
Service Utility 
4 0.9% 2.4% 1.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.1% 1.9% 2.3% 0.1% 
8 1.8% 4.8% 2.5% 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 2.5% 4.8% 0.3% 
12 2.2% 5.4% 3.4% 1.3% 1.2% 0.2% 2.2% 5.9% 0.5% 
16 2.5% 5.5% 3.7% 1.5% 1.2% 0.3% 2.0% 6.3% 0.5% 
Source: Author's calculations        
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions for Aggregate Stock Market Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
Figure 3A. Impulse responses of a given sector to a one-standard deviation shock to the log 
of death rate. 
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Figure 3B. Impulse responses of a given sector to a one-standard deviation shock to the log 
of death rate. 
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Figure 4A. Impulse responses of a given sector to a one-standard deviation shock to war 
news. 
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Figure 4B. Impulse responses of a given sector to a one-standard deviation shock to war 
news. 
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Additional Figures 
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